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BROAD-FORM DEED-OBSTACLE TO PEACEFUL CO-
EXISTENCE BETWEEN MINERAL AND SURFACE OWNERS
It wasn't ever God's intention
for the land to be torn up like
it is.,
Those are the words concerning the broad form deed and strip
mining of widowed, 76 year old Katherine Haynes, who has lived all
her life up Bull Creek, near the Eastern Kentucky hill town of Blackey.
Strip mining for coal has caused more citizen controversy, debate and
anxiety concerning the natural resources and environment of Ken-
tucky than any other ecological issue. Furthermore, more of the same
is expected as coal operators continue to sever the earth for what has
been referred to as black gold.
2
Strip mining, and more specifically contour stripping as used in
Eastern Kentucky and which is the major concern of this comment,
differs from underground mining. Underground mining removes the
coal from beneath the earth's surface, while strip mining is essentially
a method of removing coal or other minerals from the earth which
utilizes a removal of the overlying strata as the primary method of
obtaining access to the minerals.
8
BRoAD Fonm DEED
Any discussion of strip mining must instinctively include the so-
called broad form mineral deed. The broad form deed was the instru-
ment used in Eastern Kentucky at the turn of the century by coal
companies to sever the mineral estate from the surface estate. As to
the prevalence of the broad form deed, it has been stated:
Today, by conservative estimate, title to the minerals underlying
some ninety percent of the land in the Kentucky counties of Bell,
Harlan, Letcher, Perry, Knott, Pike and Floyd is severed from the
general surface by deeds of this kind. A lesser percentage of the
land is similarly affected in Knox, Whitley, McCreary, Leslie,
Lawrence and Morgan Counties. These mineral estates were
generally purchased from the landowners in the period 1785-1915
by use of the broad form deed.
4
One particular version is the "Mayo" form of mineral lease which
' The Lexington Herald, Sept. 8, 1971, at 5, col. 1.2 Schneider, Strip Mining in Kentucky, 59 Ky. L.J. 652 (1971).
3 Note, Construction of Deeds Granting the Right to Strip Mine, 40 U. Gnr. L.
REv. 304 (1971).
4 Brief for Appellants at 2, Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d
395 (Ky. 1968).
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was prevalent in Kentucky in the early 1900's. The "Mayo" form
provides that the mineral owners have the right to "use and operate
the same and surface thereof... in any manner that may be deemed
necessary or convenient for mining," and it contains a release by the
surface owner of any claim for damages in the use of the land and
surface 8
Mineral deeds severing the mineral estate from the surface estate
are not peculiar to Eastern Kentucky. Although concentration of this
comment is placed upon the broad form deed as used in Eastern
Kentucky, other states as well have been affected by these deeds.
Such mineral deeds are common throughout the coal fields of Penn-
sylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, Tennessee and other states. It is
significant, however, that of all the coal states ruling on mineral deeds
classified as the broad form type, only Kentucky has reduced the
property rights of the surface owner to a mere license to occupy the
surface, until such time as the mineral owner elects to destroy the
surface in order to remove the coal.6 The highest courts in four states
have favored the surface owner against the destruction of his estate.
There is substantial recognition in other states that the mineral owner
cannot destroy the surface owner's estate by strip mining without his
consent and without paying him fair compensation.7
KENTUCKY'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BROAD FoRM D=n
The Kentucky interpretation of the broad form mineral deed was
announced by the Court of Appeals in 1956 in the landmark case of
Buchanan v. Watson.8 The trial judge held that under the mineral
deed in question, the coal could be removed by the strip mine method,
but damages had to be paid for the destruction of the surface owner's
interest in the surface and the timber thereon. Both the mineral
owner and surface owner appealed this decision. The Kentucky Court
of Appeals held that the mineral owner could remove coal by the
strip mining process, and that the mineral owner was not liable to
the surface owner for destruction of the surface "in the absence of
arbitrary, wanton or malicious destruction."
Since the Buchanan decision, the Court has reaffirmed its view on
5 Schneider, supra note 2, at 653.
6 Id. at 654.
7 United States v. Polino, 131 F.Supp. 772 (N.D. W. Va. 1955); Franklin v.
Callicoat, 119 N.E.2cd 688 (Ohio 1954); East Ohio Gas Co. v. James Bros. Coal Co.,
85 N.E.2d 816 (Ohio 1948); Wilkes Barre Township v. Corgan, 170 A.2d 97 (Pa.
1961); Campbell v. Campbell, 199 S.W.2d 931 (Tenn. 1946); West Virginia-
Pittsburg Coal Co. v. Strong, 42 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1947).
8 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
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several occasions, 9 although this view is the minority view among
states which have ruled on the meaning of the broad form deed.10
The latest challenge to the interpretation of the broad form deed in
Kentucky arose in the case of Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Com-
pany.11 The litigation centered around the construction of a 1905
deed granted to the coal company by Martin's predecessor in title.
This deed granted the coal company the right to "use" the surface
"as may be necessary or convenient to the exercise and enjoyment of
the property rights and privileges hereby... conveyed."' 2 The deed
also contained a clause waiving the surface owner's right to sue for
damages to the surface. 13 The plaintiff contended that this deed
would not permit the owner of the mineral estate to strip mine, but
that if it did, the defendants would have to pay for the privilege.14
In a 4-3 decision, the Court of Appeals held that the owner of the
coal rights was entitled to strip mine, and furthermore, would not
be liable to the owner of the surface rights for damage to the surface
unless the mining operation should be conducted in a "wanton,
malicious or arbitrary manner" (Buchanan standard). The Court
stated that the plain language of the conveyance of the mineral
interests granted the right to remove the minerals without limitation
on the manner. The Court further stated that the word "mining"
was not limited to the sinking of a shaft but embraced other methods,
including strip mining; and, that the owner of mineral rights had
the paramount right to use the surface in the course of its business.
Exis=TG CONDriONS AT Tnvm oF SEVERANCE OF
MuimAL EsTATE FROM SURFACE ESTATE
At the turn of the century, the state of technology was such that a
surface estate and a mineral estate were compatible since underground
mining appeared to be the major form of mining. Because the grantee
was limited to the use of the land for "mining," it becomes important
9 A. J. Croley v. Round Mountain Coal Co., 374 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1964); Blue
Diamond Coal Co. v. Campbell, 371 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1963); Ritchie v. Midland
Mining Co., 347 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1961); Kodak Coal Co. v. Smith, 338 S.W.2d
699 (Ky. 1960); Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace, 337 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1960);
Bevander Coal Co. v. Mazney, 320 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1959).
10 See cases cited in note 7.
Callicoat, 119 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio 1954); East Ohio Gas Co. v. James Bros. Coal
Co., 85 N.E.2d 816 (Ohio 1948); Wilkes Barre Township v. Corgan, 170 A.2d 97
(Pa. 1961); Campbell v. Campbell, 199 S.W.2d 931 (Tenn. 1946); West Virginia-
Pittsburg Coal Co. v. Strong, 42 S.W.2d 46 (W. Va. 1947).
11429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
12 Id. at 397.
13 Id. at 399.
14 Id. at 396, noted in 40 U. CiN. L. _Ev. 304, 305 (1971).
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to ascertain the meaning of the word. In so doing, utmost consideration
should be given the ordinary meaning of this word as it was used in
the early 1900's by the grantor and the grantee because this was the
period during which severance of the mineral and surface estate
occurred due to the use of the broad form deed.
The owners of the surface estate allege that underground mining
was the type of mining conducted during this period and, therefore,
the only method of mining authorized under the broad form deed.
Several authorities contemporaneous with the period of the broad
form deed that tend to support the surface owner's contentions in
broad form deed controversies stated:
A 'mine" in its specific sense is a work for the excavation of minerals,
by means of pits, shafts, levels, tunnels, . . . as opposed to a quarry
where the whole excavation is open.... As originally used, the
word 'mine' was exclusively connected with underground work-
ings...15
The primary meaning of the word 'mine,' standing alone, is an
underground excavation in the earth from which metallic ores or
other mineral substances are taken by digging.1'
... [Tihe word 'mine' is said to be an excavation, properly under-
ground, for digging out some useful product, as ore, metal or coalY'
The mineral estate owners, on the other hand, argue that strip
mining was indeed prevalent during the period of the broad form deed.
Further, they allege that since the broad form deed stated no specific
type of mining (e.g. underground and/or strip mining) they are entitled
to obtain the coal in any manner they deem economically feasible,
whether it be by underground mining or strip mining.
An authority which supports the mineral owners' contentions
stated as follows:
Reference to coal in America was made as early as 1672, but stripmining, of a crude sort, did not come into being until around 1800.
These early strip miners worked along the crop line with picks
and shovels and wheelbarrows....
15 18 R.C.L., Mining & Minerals, § 2 (1917); noted in brief for Kentucky Civil
Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 12, Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429
S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968). (The Kentucky Civil Liberties Union is an organization
dedicated to preserving the rights of individuals and to the conservation of Ken-
tucky).
6 Crc. oF Mnn c & MniEAas, § 532 (1907); noted in brief for Kentucky
Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 12, Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co.,
429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).17 Barton v. Wichita River Oil Co., 187 S.W. 1043 (Tex. 1916); noted in
brief for Kentucky Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 12, Martin v. Ken-
tucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
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Some of the first strip mining in Kentucky was done in 1820
*.. near Paradise, on Green River in Mublenberg County.
The 'mechanical' method of strip mining employing horse-
drawn equipment probably had its beginning in Kentucky in 1870,
when Christopher Pitman opened a strip mine at London, in Laurel
County.
The year 1905 saw the opening of Kentucky's first mechanical
strip mine at Lily in Laurel County. The Lily-Jellico Coal Com-
pany contracted with the Robinson Creek Construction Company
for the stripping work, and the coal was hauled by horse-drawn
wagons to a tipple, where it was loaded into railroad cars.18
INTENT OF THE PARTIES
What was the intent of the parties during the period 1785-1915?
(the period in which the mineral estate was severed from the surface
estate in Eastern Kentucky). By every rule of contract construction,
including construction of deeds, the intention of the parties is the
ultimate question for the interpreter. 19
As can be seen from the preceeding section relating to the
existence of strip mining during the early 1900's, it is not certain
whether strip mining was or was not employed in Eastern Kentucky
at the time of the severance of the mineral and surface estates. Perhaps
the question should be that expressed by Judge Hill of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in his dissenting opinion in Martin v. Kentucky Oak
Mining Company:
What was the intention of the parties in 1905? This question pro-
vokes another question, What were the usual, known, and accepted
mining methods at that time?20
While it is true that the broad form deeds conveyed all the coal,
it is contended by the surface owners that the method of recovery was
limited to the method practiced in the region at the time of the broad
form deed grant. The Buchanan decision and the mineral estate
owner's argumentation, however, seems to have been based on the
proposition that the parties clearly intended to convey the coal for
the purpose of enabling the grantee to remove the coal from under
the surface of the land. And, therefore, to deny the grantee the right
18 TnE KENUCKY DEPARTlMNT OF NATURAL REsouRcEs, STRw MNING IN
KENTucKY, 6 (1965); noted in brief for Appellees at 22, Martin v. Kentucky Oak
Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
19 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 295 (1963).20 Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 401 (Ky. 1968)
(dissenting opinion).
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to remove the coal by the only feasible process would defeat the
principal purpose of the conveyance. 21
It is inconceivable that the surface owners would have authorized
the destruction of their land and the eventual disinheritance of their
children for a mere fifty cents to a few dollars per acre. As undoubtedly
contemplated by the parties, the mineral owner would not be harassed
by suits for damages resulting from waste dumps and drying up of
wells, the reasonably forseeable results of underground mining.22 As
stated by Harry M. Caudill, a well known critic of strip mine practices:
... [T]here was no meeting of the minds between the purchaser
and the sellers to the effect that the surface could be turned upside-
down and destroyed, and that the proposition was never con-
sidered, never broached, never discussed and never agreed upon.23
And it is fundamental that an agreement enforceable at law con-
sist of two persons being of the same mind concerning the matter
agreed upon.2
4
CONSTRUION OF Tn DEED AGAINsT TH GxANTOrt
It has been traditionally held that a written contract is construed
most strictly against the one drafting it. Because a deed is generally
prepared by the grantor, a corollary of this principal is that where
there is ambiguity or uncertainty in a deed, it will be construed most
strongly against the grantor and in favor of the grantee.2 5 The basic
rationale given for construing an ambiguous instrument against the
grantor is that the deed is expressed in words of the grantors election,
and thus, he is chargeable with the language used.26
The mineral estate owners (strip miners) reinforce these general
principles by stating that a technical rule of construction may be
invoked only in construing an ambiguous or uncertain deed or con-
tract,27 and that technical rules of construction are not to be resorted
2l Brief for Kentucky Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 8, Martin v.
Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).22 Brief for Appellants at 12-13, Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429
S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
23 Id. at 13.24 Tucker v. Pete Sheeran Bro. & Co., 160 S.W. 176 (Ky. 1913); cited in brief
for Appellants at 12, Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky.
1968).
25 Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956); Mclntire v. Marian Coal
Co., 227 S.W. 298 (Ky. 1921). In Kentucky Diamond Mining and Developing Co.
v. Kentucky Transvaal Diamond Co., 132 S.W. 397, 899 (Ky. 1910), the corollary
as well as its rationale was given as follows:
A deed is to be construed against the grantor rather than against the
grantee because the grantor selects his own words....2 6 23 A. Jut. 2d Deeds § 165 (1965).2 7 Brief for Kentucky Members of the National Council of Coal Lessors, Inc.
as Amicus Curiae at 15-16, Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W. 2d 895
(Ky. 1968).
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to when the meaning of the parties is plain and obvious. 28 Thus, when
there is no ambiguity in a deed the intent of a plain instrument must
be found within its four corners.
2 9
The broad form deed has been expressly held to be unambiguous
for almost a half century beginning in Mclntire v. Marian Coal Com-
pany:30
There is no claim that the terms of the deed are ambiguous or
uncertain, and no such claim could well be made, for it leaves
nothing to be supplied, but makes a sweeping and complete con-
veyance of all the coal and other minerals and certain specified
rights and privileges to the company, to be by it exercised at will
... whenever and where 'deemed necessary or convenient' by the
grantee or its successors in title, . . . and that McIntire and his
grantees should have the free use of the surface only when and to
the extent that the company did not deem the surface either 'neces-
sary or convenient' to its business.
The mineral estate owners therefore reason that Buchanan and Martin
applied only the rule from Mclntire that a deed which grants land
and certain specified rights, there being no ambiguity in the in-
strument, will be construed in compliance with its terms.
The surface estate owners, on the other hand, contend that from
McIntire to the present date, the corollary has been recited without
reason for it. The result has been a blind application of the rule
without regard to who prepared the instrument.
The Court in Martin emphasized that it was construing the deed
against the grantors predecessors in title.8 ' Employing a textbook rule
of construction, that an ambiguous deed is to be construed against its
maker, this decision contrasts sharply with the Court's traditional
failure to utilize the proper rule of construction with respect to the
intentions of the parties to the deed. The Court failed to focus on
the fact that the deed in Martin had been prepared by the defendant
grantee's attorney.32 Judicial notice should be taken that the broad
form deed was not prepared by the grantors. It is common knowledge
28Combs v. Hounshell, 347 S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1961); Hall v. Meade, 51
S.W.2d 974 (Ky. 1932).
29 Gabbard v. Short, 351 S.W.2d 510 (Ky. 1961); Lambert v. Pritchett, 284
S.W.2d 90 (Ky. 1955); Hudson v. Collins, 233 S.W. 1101 (Ky. 1920); Allen v.
Henson, 217 S.W. 120 (K. 1919). In Sword v. Sword, 252 S.W.2d 869, 870
(Ky. 1952) the Court stated:
Where the language employed in a deed is uncertain in its meaning, it is
proper to consider the nature of the instrument, the situation of the parties
executing it, and the objects which they have in view.
30227 S.W. 298, 299 (Ky. 1921).
31429 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Ky. 1968).32 Note, Construction of Deeds Granting the Right to Strip Mine, 40 U. Gn.
L. REv. 304, 305 (1971).
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that the coal companies and their highly skilled draftsmen prepared
the printed broad form deeds. More than 25 per cent of such mineral
deeds were signed by grantors who could so much as scrawl their
names.33 Therefore, since the coal companies selected the words to
be used in the deeds, the deeds should properly be construed against
the coal company, the draftsman of the broad form deed, as it alone
caused the uncertainty to exist.34
SPECISIC GRANT TO STmI MuNE
It is argued by the mineral owners that the broad form mineral
deed should be construed to permit strip mining because such mining
was in existence in Eastern Kentucky at the time the broad form
deeds were executed.3 5 Accepting this statement as true, it would tend
to emphasize the responsibility of the draftsman of the broad form
deed to specifically include the right to mine in such manner. Thus, if
strip mining were known in a locality, it would have been a simple
procedure to insert this type of mining into the deed.
The West Virginia and Pennsylvania courts focused directly on
whether the parties intended to authorize the practice of strip mining.
After consideration the courts concluded that parties to a deed made
prior to general acceptance of strip mining would not be deemed to
have transferred such a right, because if they had so intended, they
would have mentioned the practice. 36 As an example, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania employed this rationale in Heidt v. Aughenbaugh
Coal Co., where the parties used the following language:
The right to mine to include all practical methods now in use, or
which may hereafter be used, and the use of improved machinery
and fixtures or appliances for said purposes and the right to strip
the surface for, excavate, dig, bore, shaft, quarry, and otherwise
•...7 [emphasis added].
Faced with this language the court found an express grant to strip
mine because the right to mine in such manner was plainly set out in
unambigious terms.
The surface estate owners contend that strip mining was not in
common use at the time of severance of the mineral estate from the
surface estate, but if it were, it was not provided for by express
33 H. CAUDmL, NxGrr COMES TO THE Cum mauANDS, 70, 74 (1963).34 Brief for Sierra Club as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Martin v. Kentucky Oak
Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
35 Brief for Big Sandy-Elhorn Coal Operators Association as Amicus Curiae
at 8, Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).36 See supra note 32, at 311.
37 176 A.2d 400, 402 (Pa. 1962). Noted in 40 U. CIN. L. REv., supra note 32.
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language and therefore underground mining is the only form of
mining authorized by the broad form mineral deed. In New Charter
Coal Co. v. McKee,38 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania discussed
the textbook practice of construing standard form deeds prepared
by the grantee against the grantor and stated that normally a deed
should be construed against the grantor "unless, of course, the grantee
drafted the grant and was therefore responsible for the ambiguity."39
Where one party to a contract is privileged to set forth the terms to
which another party is to assent, and a controversy arises as to the
meaning, the contract should be construed strictly against the writer
and liberally toward the other party.40 A provision of a contract
which does not clearly express the intention of the parties should be
construed against the one for whose benefit it was inserted.
Thus, it becomes important to determine which party wrote the
deed, the mining customs when the deed was written, and whether
the coal had already been strip mined. Buchanan and Martin attempt
to imply the right to strip mine from the conveyance of the coal. If
this implication is correct, it appears that the coal companies should
be chargeable with the language actually used in the deeds. To do
otherwise would be contrary to principles of fairness and justice as
well as contrary to an established rule of law of construing the
contract against the one who caused the ambiguity.
DisPT cy IN CoNsuING Om. DED As OPPOSED TO COAL Drnns
Contrary to the established position it has taken with respect to
the surface mining of coal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has followed
an entirely opposite view of construction concerning oil rights. In
Wiser Oil Company v. Conley,41 the Court held that parties to a 1917
lease intended that the oil should be produced by drilling in a
customary manner prevailing when the lease was executed, and the
holders of the lease would be liable to the surface owner for damage
to the surface of the land and coal thereunder resulting from the use
of a "water-flooding" method to increase the oil production. "Water-
flooding" was a new method of extracting oil that was highly destructive
to the surface. The Court held that the right "to use all means and
appliances on or off these premises to secure and facilitate the produc-
38 191 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1963).
39 Id. at 833. Noted in 40 U. CIN. L. Bxv., supra note 32, at 311.
4 o Green v. Royal Neighbors, 73 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1937); Annot., 114 A.L.R. 244.
41346 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1961).
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tion of oil and gas" and the fact that all of the oil was conveyed
did not give the mineral holder the right to destroy the surface.
42
Concerning this decision, the Court in Martin said:
It is suggested that the court in Wiser Oil Company v. Conley did
depart from the principles of Buchanan v. Watson, in respect to
oil rights.... Perhaps Wiser is distinguishable from Buchanan on
some basis other than that stated in the opinion in Wiser, or
perhaps it is a departure from Buchanan. In any event we do not
feel compelled in this opinion to explain, justify, reconcile or dis-
tinguish Wiser. The Court has decided to adhere to Buchanan
whether or not it conflicts with Wiser.43
Judge Hill's dissenting opinion in Martin was more emphatic: "Wiser
and Buchanan are as inconsistent as sin and salvation."4
STARE DEcisis
The rule stare decisis finds support in the principle that courts
ought not to withdraw or overrule decisions which have been promul-
gated and published by them, and on the faith and credit of which
individuals and the public have entered into contracts or acquired
property rights.45 The rights of the owners of subterranean mineral
interests have been established by a long history of case law. There-
fore, parties acting on these enumerated rights have bought and sold
mineral interests on the strength of such precedent. 46 The application
of stare decisis induced the Court of Appeals to the result that it
reached in the Martin case.
It is suggested by the mineral owners that even if the Buchanan
decision were not abundantly justified by well established principles
of law, since the ruling has been effective for sixteen years and
reaffirmed repeatedly by the Court, it would be the height of injustice
at this time to reverse that decision and hence destroy the rights of
persons who have made substantial investments in reliance upon it.
Coal operators have made large investments through the acquisition
of mineral rights and the purchase of tremendously expensive equip-
ment in reliance upon Buchanan. To reverse Buchanan now would
be to take away these very substantial investments without recognizing
the operator's constitutional rights to due process of law. If precedents
421d. at 720.
4 8 Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Ky. 1968).
44Id. at 402.45 Balard County v. Kentucky County Debt Commission, 162 S.W.2d 771, 773
(Ky. 1942).4 0 Hurst, The Broad Form Mineral Deed as Interpreted by the Court of Ap-
peals of Kentucky, 29 Ky. ST. BAR. J. No. 6, 39, 42 (1965).
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pertaining to property law can be overturned at the whim of those
who attack those precedents, the result would be such chaos as to
deter investments by even the most daring and foolhardy of entre-
preneurs. 47 The doctrine of stare decisis requires that there be no
departure from the established rule.48
The surface owners are quick to counteract this argument by point-
ing out that the Court has not hesitated to overrule an earlier case
where the opinion was unsound. The Court recognizes that stare
decisis in its most rigorous form does not prevent the courts from
correcting their own errors, or from establishing new rules of law
when facts and circumstances of life have rendered an old rule
unworkable and unjust. A recent example is Haney v. City of Lexing-
ton,49 where the Court of Appeals receded from prior decisions which
held municipal corporations immune from ordinary torts. Thus, the
doctrine of stare decisis is a golden, not an iron, rule. It does not
foreclose progress in the law by preventing a court from recognizing
new interests or correcting its prior mistakes.50
In his book entitled The Nature of the Judicial Process, Justice
Cardozo said:
But I am ready to concede that the rule of adherence to precedent,
though it ought not be abandoned, ought to be in some degree
relaxed. I think that when a rule, after it has been found to be
inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare,
there should be less hesitation in frank avowel and full abandon-
ment.
5 1
Also, the late Judge Jerome Frank once stated:
Judges, like doctors and others are reluctant to admit they made
mistakes. Then, too, there is plain old-fashioned animal laziness.
It's a nuisance to revise what you have once settled.52
When facts and circumstances of modem life have rendered an
old rule unworkable and unjust, the courts should establish new rules
of case law. This was recognized by Judge Hill in Martin:
47 Brief for Big Sandy-Elkhom Coal Operators Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 12,
Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).48 Asher v. Bennett, 136 S.W. 879 (Ky. 1911).
49 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964).5 0 Brief for Sierra Club as Amicus Curiae at 13, Martin v. Kentucky Oak Min-
ing Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).51 B. CAlmozo, THE NATuRE OF =H JUDIcIAL PRocEss, 142, 150 (1922); noted
in brief for Sierra Club as Amicus Curiae at 14, Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining
Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (1968).
52 J. Fn , COURTS ON TArm, 272, 273 (1950); noted in brief for Sierra
Club as Amicus Curiae at 14-15, Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d
395 (Ky. 1968).
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I freely recognize and respect the rule of stare decisis, and I op-
pose changing rules of law without compelling reasons, but it is
wrong and unjust to take the position that once judicial error has
gained the respectability of age it becomes somehow invulnerable
to correction by the court which made it.
5 3
AcruAL Pnicr=c
What has been the outcome of the Court's failure to change the
result reached in Martin?
The practice of severing the surface and mineral estates with
the concomitant result that the surface owner has no hope or ex-
pectation of monetary gain from the successful exploitation of the
mineral estate has, perhaps, more than any other factor contributed
to the 'unpeaceful coexistence' between the surface owner and the
mineral lessee.5 4
Because of the Court's adherence to its decisions in Buchanan and
Martin, the owner of the mineral rights is immune from liability for
damages to the surface owner for such surface rights as may be
destroyed by strip mining.
It is generally recognized that land agents for the coal operators
approach surface owners with the intent to secure written consent to
strip mine, complete with a release from liability for any damage to
the surface caused thereby. Regardless of whether payment is the
traditional 25¢ or 50¢ per lineal foot of property measured along the
coal seam, or Pike County's 100 per ton, the operators hold all the
cards. If the surface owners refuse to consent to this one sided
contract the Buchanan decision allows the operator to strip the land
anyway without even a token payment. Thus, many surface owners
have little choice-they accept what is offered or nothing. Such is the
daily activity in the coal areas of Eastern Kentucky, adding to the
general distrust in the ability of the legal process to protect property
from the ravages of strip mining. Many people of the area feel
strongly that the courts and judicial system exist only to protect
the rights of the wealthy mineral owners and strip mine operators. 55
As Judge Hill so appropriately commented:
They [the operators] have shown in actual practice such little
regard for the justice and fairness of Buchanan that they have not
had the heart to take advantage of their legal windfall safeguarded
5 3 Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 402 (Ky. 1968)
(dissenting opinion).
54 J. Bailey, Disruptions to Peaceful Coexistence of Surface Owner & Mineral
Lessee, 2 NATuRAL RusoutcEs LAwYRm 154, 155 (1969).
55 Schneider, supra note 2, at 652.
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and guaranteed by the rule in Buchanan and have in many cases
been compensating the surface owner for 'oppressive' damages
done the surface owner.56
Whether this attempt by the strip mine operators to purchase strip
mining rights is the result of their charitable nature or whether it
reflects the coal industry's belief that Buchanan and Martin are legally
unsound is a debatable question.
CONCLUSION
There is something that violates the very character and concept
of America in the fact that a company in its search for coal may
enter another man's property against his wishes, destroy his land,
wreck his livelihood, and endanger his home, family and personal
safety....
This is not right. This is not the decent or civilized way of
doing things. Disregarding the waste of our natural resources and
the violation of all rules of conservation and common sense, this
flies in the face of the American belief in fair play, the sanctity of
private ownership, and the right of every man to have, hold,
develop and defend what is rightfully his .... 57
The judicial interpretation of the broad form deed is a public
question vital to the welfare of the citizens of a large area of Kentucky.
At the time the broad form mineral deed was entered into by the
grantors and grantees, co-existence and compatibility of the two
estates was contemplated. Since that time, technological change has
produced an irreconcilable conflict in this concept; justice cannot be
achieved by an arbitrary preference of the mineral holder over the
surface owner.
The original grantees (coal companies) prepared the broad form
deeds and for a trivial sum secured their execution by people who
could not even sign their names; 58 for example, in 1880 the total Ken-
tucky population was 1,163,498 and of this number 29.9 per cent or
348,392 people were illiterate. By 1900 the total population in Ken-
tucky was 1,589,685 and of this number 262,954 or 16.5 per cent of the
56 Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 403 (Ky. 1968)
(dissenting opinion).
57 Louisville Courier-Journal, July 6, 1967, at 14, col. 17; noted in brief for
the Appalachian Group to Save the Land and People at 4, Martin v. Kentucky Oak
Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968). (The Appalachian Group to Save the
Land and People is a private non-profit organization dedicated to the conservation
and well-being of the citizens of Kentucky by opposing strip-mining in Eastern
Kentucky).
58 "ef for Kentucky Civil Liberties Union as Amincus Curiae at 19, Martin v.
Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
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residents were illiterate 9 Furthermore, it is a valid assumption that
the Eastern Kentucky counties-the counties where the broad form
deed was introduced-would have an even higher illiteracy rate than
the state as a whole.
The broad form deed as prepared by the coal operators does not
deserve the broad interpretation being given it by the Court. The
coal industry did not bargain for what it received and the surface
owners did not sell such a license as the Court has construed for the
destruction of the land they devised to the present generation. If one
may be legally deprived of the use of his land without his consent
and without fair compensation, disrespect for the law is bred.60
Buchanan stated that the grantee could remove coal by strip mining
processes which would result in destruction of the surface and was
not liable for damages to surface owners for such destruction in the
absence of arbitrary, wanton or malicious destruction. Because wan-
toness is a state of mind difficult of proof, total ruin of the surface
estate is the end result.61
Since the grantees prepared the broad form deeds, they should be
held liable for the ambiguity which resulted from the deed's failure
to state explicitly what type mining was intended by the parties (e.g.,
strip or underground). The Court should therefore declare that in
the case of those mineral deeds which do not expressly describe the
method of mining, the mineral owner may not employ strip mining
as a method of extraction without the consent of the surface owner
and, under no circumstances, without payment for the destruction of
the surface rights. As expressed by Judge Hill in Martin:
I am shocked and appalled that the court of last resort in the
beautiful state of Kentucky would ignore the logic and reasoning
of the great majority of other states and lend its approval and en-
couragement to the diabolical devastation and destruction of a
large part of the surface of this fair state without compensation to
the owners thereof.
62
The Kentucky Court of Appeals should not deny the property
rights of thousands of landowners in Eastern Kentucky by citing a
a decision which is contrary to law in other states. The Court should
5902 TwELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED) STATES, 1900, Part II, at xcii (1902).
(Illteracy is defined as all those persons over 10 years of age who have not acquiredthe aliy to read and write in any language).6o Brief for Appellants at 21, Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429
S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
61 id. at 9.
62 Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 402 (Ky. 1968) (dis-
senting opinion).
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overrule Buchanan and Martin, and if this does not give the surface
owners adequate relief, then the Legislature can further restrict the
rights of the mineral owner. But in no event should the Kentucky
Court view its role as passive. The Court should be responsive to the
social pressures of today and adjust accordingly.
Michael V. Withrow
